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Abstract
This chapter addresses the political relevance and/or implications of 
religious diversity in the Philippines, focusing on the re-emergence of Is-
lam as an important socio-political factor among the “Moro” (Philippine 
Muslims) society in the context of the Muslim secessionist movement. In 
pre-colonial times, Islam had a strong influence among the Moros not 
only in the purely cultural or religious domains, but also in the broader 
socio-political and public domain in several ways. However, since the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, the substantial influences and public sig-
nificance of Islam in the public sphere diminished considerably because of 
US colonization and the secularization policy of Moro society in general. 
However, this de-facto “de-politicization” of Islam has notably reversed as 
a consequence of both Muslim secessionism and the Islamic resurgence 
trend, which have both ethno-national and transnational characteristics. 
As a matter of fact, Islam has been emphasized as one of the ideological 
pillars of the MILF, the largest Muslim separatist organization in the Phil-
ippines. For example, the MILF practices various activities in accordance 
with Islam, such as establishing Madrasahs, Sharia Courts, and promoting 
Islamic resurgence or Dawwah as well. Once marginalized, Islam has re-
emerged in the Southern Philippines in the context of Islamic resurgence 
and a political Muslim secessionist movement.
Key words:   Muslim  Secessionism,  Moro,  Mindanao,  MILF,  Islamic 
Resurgence
1   Introduction - Islam and the “Moro” in the Context of Philip-
pines Cultural Diversity
This chapter addresses the relevance or implication of religious diversity in the 
Philippines by focusing on the social relevance of Islam among the “Moro” (ge-
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neric term for Muslims in the Philippines) in the socio-cultural context of the 
Southern Philippines, including its relation to the Muslim secessionist move-
ment.
I will begin with a general social and historical overview of the Moro Muslim 
minority community in the Philippines. In Section 3, I examine basic cultural 
characteristics of Moro society by focusing on its “intra-religious” diversity, name-
ly, dynamics between so-called “folk-Islamic” belief and Islamic resurgence. I will 
then analyze a more public and/or political dimension of Islam, especially the 
relevance of Islam in the Mindanao conflict and the Moro secessionist move-
ment in the Philippines. In particular, I will shed light on the complex interplay 
between national and transnational dimensions of the Muslim Secessionist move-
ment, its ideological background, its various social activities, and so on. In doing 
this, I will show how Islam – a once marginalized religion in the Philippines - re-
emerged as a significant social factor in the context of Islamic resurgence and 
the political Muslim secessionist movement.
2   Socio-Historical Overview of Islam and the Philippines Mus-
lim Community
The Philippines is in fact a multi-cultural (multi-religious) country although 
over 90% of the population are Christians (especially Catholic). There are also 
various ethno-religious minorities scattered throughout the archipelago. The 
so-called “Moro”, or Muslim minority in the southern Philippines is particularly 
distinctive and relevant in several ways. It is highly difficult to estimate the exact 
population of the Moro, but according to various estimates, they number about 
five to seven million persons; 5–7% of the Philippines population. Originally, 
most dwelled in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, in the southern border 
zone of the Philippines. However, some recently migrated to other areas includ-
ing Luzon and Visayas. Hundreds of thousands of Moro also live in the north 
Borneo area of Sabah state in Malaysia, having escaped from Mindanao conflicts 
since the 1970s. The Moro are distinctive in preserving their unique historical 
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and cultural heritage, and ethno-political identity to this day.
Anthropologically, the Moro consist of thirteen different ethno-linguistic 
groups including the Magundanaos, the Maranaos, the Tausugs, and the Samas. 
However, they have all practiced Islam since the thirteenth to fourteenth cen-
tury and are thus known commonly as the “Bangsa Moro” (the Moro nation). As 
we will see in the next section, the Moro had already established independent 
Islamic Sultanates in Mindanao and Sulu by the fifteenth century. The Muslims 
in the Philippine archipelago strongly resisted colonization by the Spanish in 
the sixteenth century and effectively repulsed colonial invasion until the end of 
Spanish colonial rule of the Philippine islands in the last part of the nineteenth 
century. Partly because of this historical trajectory and partly because of religious 
differences, the Moro preserve, up to this day, an ethnic or socio-political iden-
tity as a Muslim minority distinct from that of majority Christian Filipinos in the 
Philippines1.
Though exact details of Islam’s introduction to the Philippines remain 
sketchy, we can trace its process through the tarsila (royal genealogies) of the 
Muslim rulers of Mindanao and Sulu, and from other relevant sources. The term 
“tarsila” comes from the Arabic “silsilah” (“link” or “chain”). It is used in the 
southern Philippines - as in other parts of the Indonesian and Malay worlds - to 
refer to written royal genealogies. According to Majul’s detailed interpretation 
of the Sulu tarsila, a certain Tuan Mashaika came to Sulu as one of the earliest 
known Muslim (Arab) missionaries2. He was buried in Jolo Island in the Sulu 
archipelago, and was presumed to be one of the founding members of the Mus-
lim community in Sulu. Though the exact date of his coming to Sulu is still un-
known, one can estimate it as the early fourteenth century.
In 1380, Sheikh Karimul Makdum (Tuan Sharif Awliya), an Arabic mis-
sionary/trader, came to Simunul Island, Southern Sulu. He founded a mosque 
there, which is the oldest mosque ever built in the Philippines. Majul says that 
the coming of these makdumim (Islamic missionaries) to the Philippines at that 
time was an event contemporaneous with similar phenomenon in other parts of 
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the Malay World, and they were not without Sufi elements. After the coming of 
Sheikh Makdum, a Muslim fleet from Minangkabau, Sumatra, came to Jolo, and 
its leader, Raja Baguinda, established himself as leader of the Muslim community 
in Sulu3.
In 1450, Sayyed Abu Bakar, an Arabic descendant of the Prophet Mu-
hammed, came to Jolo, and married the daughter of Raja Baguinda. After the 
death of Raja Baguinda, Sayyed Abu Bakar founded the Sultanate of Sulu and 
established Islam as the religious and political foundation of the Sulu Sultanate. 
Around the end of the sixteenth century and in the first decades of the seven-
teenth century, political alliances with the other Malay Muslim principalities, 
such as the Sultanate of Brunei, against the increasing dangers of Western colo-
nization guaranteed the preservation of Islam in the southern Philippines.
During the pre-colonial period in general, both the Sulu and the Maguind-
anao Sultanates were typical Malay coastal states in maritime Southeast Asia. The 
political and economic center of the Sulu Sultanate was Jolo Island. The trading 
zone of the Sulu Sultanate extended far beyond the Sulu Archipelago itself. Ac-
cording to Warren, the trade was systematically incorporated into long distance 
maritime trade between the maritime worlds of Southeast Asia and China4.
Similar to other Malay maritime states, the Maguindanao and the Sulu Sul-
tanates embraced Islam as a state religion. Because of this, Muslims in Mindanao 
and Sulu followed quite different patterns of historical development compared 
with the rest of the Philippines archipelago. The latter was colonized and Chris-
tianized by Spanish colonial power. In contrast, Muslims in the south fiercely 
resisted colonial invasion by the Spanish up to the end of colonial rule of the 
Philippines in the end of nineteenth century5.
To this day, Muslim society in Mindanao and Sulu maintains its distinctive 
Islamic cultural heritage within the Christian dominated Philippines republic. 
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a Spanish military outpost was con-
structed in Jolo Island. In 1898, the United States won a war with Spain resulting 
from rivalry over Cuba and consequentially took possession of the entire Philip-
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pine Archipelago, including Mindanao and Sulu. It was only after colonization 
by the United States that the Moro Sultanates were finally brought to an end.
3   Intra-Religious Diversity — Dynamics between Traditional 
“Folk-Islamic” Belief and Islamic Resurgence
Here we describe the general features and internal cultural diversity of Islamic 
practices among the Muslim community in the southern Philippines. Generally 
speaking, the basic framework and tenets of Islam for Muslim Filipinos is not so 
different from those in other regions, including belief in Allah or almighty God, 
and the so-called five pillars of Islam based on the Quran and the Hadith.
However, if you observe the details of beliefs and religious practices of Mus-
lim Filipinos from ethnographic points of view, you will notice a variety of folk 
belief elements which are not necessarily consistent with Islamic tenets or prac-
tices of other regions, especially practices of Middle Eastern origin. For example, 
we can easily observe the existence of so-called animistic beliefs among the Moro 
in some parts of Mindanao and Sulu. In this belief system, people believe in 
the existence of various spirits in non-human things, e.g. animals, plants, trees, 
stones, and so on. In some cases, local Muslims give offerings to the spirits as 
signs of respect and worship. Shamanism is another notable folk belief element 
among some of the Moro in several, mainly rural, parts of the southern Philip-
pines, especially Sulu (Kiefer 1985).
As an example, I will introduce the case of the Sama people in Tabawan 
Island in the Sulu archipelago, in which I conducted a field research during the 
1990s. The Sama people in Tabawan are, without exception, Muslims, and com-
prise one group of the Moro or Muslim Filipino population. Though the Sama 
in Tabawan are Muslims, they are also known for their strong adherence to “folk” 
or “pre-Islamic” elements among their local religious practices. In particular, Ta-
bawan Island people are famous for shamanic belief even compared with other 
Sama speaking groups on neighboring islands in Sulu. Traditionally, Tabawan 
shamanism is based on belief in spirits called duwata (spirits).
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Tabawan shamans, locally called papagan, allegedly communicate with du-
wata as spirit-mediums, cure the sick, and perform divination, while possessed by 
these spirits. Most female shamans also serve as midwives. Most shamans develop 
their ability after recovering from a serious illness or after having mystical visions 
in their dreams. This belief in duwata has strong connections with the traditional 
cosmology of Tabawan Island. Generally speaking, this kind of belief is called “folk 
Islam” and thought to be an amalgam or syncretic mixture of Islam and “pre-Is-
lamic” folk traditions.
In contrast, there are emerging trends among the Muslim Filipinos calling 
for a form of “more correct Islam”; in general, an Islamic resurgence. Concrete 
examples of the Islamic resurgence phenomenon notably include: an increase 
in numbers of mosques and madrasas (religious schools), strict abstinence from 
alcoholic drinking, veil-wearing by women, and increasing numbers of Islamic 
campaign seminars, Quran reading contests, and other events. Activities such as 
Islamic Seminars in madrasas aimed at propagating more “correct”, “orthodox”, 
or “pure” forms of Islam have become more visible in recent years. These activi-
ties are part of what is sometimes called the dawwah (or dakwah) movement. One 
distinctive feature of local dawwah movements and activities is their strong con-
nection with foreign dawwah groups or movements in other Islamic countries.
In Sulu, for example, most activities by local dawwah groups are performed 
in coordination with foreign dawwah groups in Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
and so on. Their main areas of influence are in relatively urbanized areas like 
the city of Jolo in Sulu province and the city of Bongao in Tawi Tawi province. 
Both of them are provincial capitals and are socio-economic centers of their 
respective provinces. Madrasa teachers, generally named ustadz, are among the 
most active members of the dawwah movement. It is pointed out that sometimes 
these trends raise tensions among local Muslims, especially between members 
of dawwah movements and more traditional/conservative Muslims who cling to 
folk-Islamic traditions6.
Though Islamic resurgence itself is not necessary a “political” phenome-
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non, it is hard to dis-entangle it from the socio-political context of Muslim se-
cessionism and the Mindanao conflict. For example, at the height of Mindanao 
conflict in the 1970s, the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front, a secessionist 
organization founded in the early 1970s) and other Muslim rebels in the Philip-
pines were strongly supported, both morally and substantially, by other Islamic 
countries like Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Pakistan, etc.. In this political envi-
ronment, Islamic resurgence or a deepening sense of Islamic consciousness dras-
tically grew into a significant social phenomenon in Muslim areas in Mindanao 
and Sulu during the Mindanao conflict.
Even the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the most significant seces-
sionist organization active since the late 1990s) has quite actively engaged in 
dawwah activity in some parts of Mindanao for the propagation of “correct” or 
“true” versions of Islam to local Muslims, as I will explain later.
4   The Mindanao Conflict and the Rise of the Moro Secessionist 
Movement
4.1  Background of the Mindanao Conflict
As I have stated in previous sections, unlike the colonized Christian majority in 
the north, Muslims in the southern Philippines had historically formed their 
own sultanates or Islamic kingdoms. Because of this, they maintained their dis-
tinctive cultural traits and identities, fiercely resisting colonization by the Span-
ish. But since the turn of the twentieth century, through colonization by the 
United States, Muslim society in the south, known as “Moro Province”, gradually 
became incorporated into the colonial framework of the time7.
After the Second World War, the Muslim area of the southern Philippines 
was totally incorporated into a newly independent nation-state: The Republic of 
the Philippines. But this was not at all a happy union, at least for the Moro. Fac-
ing the massive influx of Christian farmers to the “land of promise” - a synonym 
for Mindanao - the Muslims in Mindanao and Sulu began to feel more and more 
marginalized in their own homeland. Eventually during the second half of the 
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1960s, land disputes between Christian migrants and Muslim locals gradually 
lead to sporadic armed confrontation. In 1968, Datu Matalam, a traditional Mus-
lim politician in Mindanao, declared the beginning of the “Mindanao Indepen-
dence Movement (MIM)”.
In the first half of the 1970s, armed conflict between the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines and the MNLF led by Sulu born Muslim intellectual, Prof. Nur 
Misuari, escalated almost to the level of conventional warfare. Even Jolo, the cap-
ital city of Sulu province, was totally destroyed in 1974 as a result of heavy fight-
ing. This “Mindanao conflict” has profoundly impacted many areas in Mindanao 
and Sulu, even to this day8.
In 1996, the MNLF agreed to sign a so-called Final Peace Agreement with 
the Philippine government, then headed by President Fidel Ramos. By this 
agreement, the MNLF accepted autonomy within the framework of Philippines 
sovereignty instead of total secession from the Philippines. In accepting this 
agreement, Misuari became the governor of ARMM (Autonomous Region for 
Muslim Mindanao).
However, this was not the end of the conflict in the southern Philippines. 
The final peace agreement and the new autonomous government led by Misu-
ari did not fulfill expectations of peace and economic prosperity in the region, 
because of lack of promised support from the central government, corruption/
nepotism, malfunction among officials of the autonomous government, etc. 
Besides that, the MILF, the largest secessionist organization remaining, was not 
included in the peace agreement and thus vowed to continue their armed strug-
gle.
So far, at least 150,000 people have died and more or less 1 million peo-
ple have been displaced as refugees or as IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons). 
Recently, in March 2014, the MILF finally signed the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement with the Philippines government, led by President Benigno Aqui-
no III. Still, other armed rebels like the ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) and the BIFF 
(Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters: a splinter group from the MILF, led by 
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Commander Ustadz Kato) continue their activities and sometimes cause sporad-
ic armed encounters with government forces in the southern Philippines.
4.2   The Peace Process between the MILF and the Philippine govern-
ment
As stated previously, the MNLF’s popularity had rapidly waned among local Mus-
lims after it became clear that the autonomous government led by Misuari did 
not achieve the peace and development promised for the region. In contrast, 
the MILF has gained popularity as a remaining legitimate movement for the 
cause of the Moro. One factor for this rising popularity is, as I stated before, the 
failure of the MNLF. Another factor is the MILF’s various local activities, includ-
ing social-welfare activities which I will describe later.
Originally, the MILF split from the MNLF in 1984. Since the 2000s, it has 
become the largest armed secessionist group in the Muslim south, counting at 
least 10,000 members. During the 2000s, the MILF caused intermittent armed 
confrontations with the government. At the same time, it has continued peace 
negotiations brokered by Malaysia and several other countries. One of the turn-
ing points in this peace process was in August 2008. Before that, the government 
refused to recognize a right to so-called “Ancestral Domain”, claimed by the 
MILF as Muslim territory appropriated by Christian settlers throughout Ameri-
can colonization. By July 2008, the Philippine government and MILF had agreed 
to settle this issue by setting up an autonomous political body called the BJE 
(Bangsamoro Juridical Entity) to administer the area claimed as “Ancestral Do-
main.”
However, before the formal signing of the MOA-AD (Memorandum of 
Agreement on Ancestral Domain) in Kuala Lumpur, the arrangement was re-
jected by the Supreme Court of the Philippines as “un-constitutional”. Subse-
quently, the Philippine government cancelled the signing. This cancellation was 
due partly to strong opposition to the peace deal by some Christian politicians 
and businessmen who had political and business interests in the area. After the 
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abrupt cancelation of the MOA-AD, the peace process between the MILF and 
the Philippine government collapsed entirely.
Soon after this development, severe fighting between some elements of the 
MILF, especially a faction led by Umbra Kato, then a commander of the MILF 
105th Base Command, and government forces assisted by Christian vigilantes 
broke out in Mindanao. The armed clashes continued until 2009.
The fighting inflicted incredible damage to the lives and assets of tens of 
thousands of local people, both Moro and Christians. In one estimate, more 
than 700,000 people were displaced as IDPs, and thousands of houses were de-
stroyed in battle.
The author visited several “Evacuation Centers (EC)” or de-facto refugee 
camps in Maguindanao province in 2009 and 2010 for field research on the 
conflict. I noticed a lot of Muslim evacuees were forced to settle in these camps 
under miserable health and food conditions. Though several government agen-
cies, international organizations like the UNWFP (United Nations World Food 
Program), and foreign NGOs have engaged actively in assisting the evacuees, it 
was not uncommon for some evacuees to get sick and/or die during their time 
in the camps, because of ill-health and lack of nutrition, especially for children.
In my field interviews, several Muslim evacuees told their stories, including 
one woman who witnessed five relatives killed by government bombardment. 
Some human rights groups and activists have raised criticisms that some ele-
ments of government forces committed serious human rights violations during 
the fighting, including indiscriminate attacks on Muslim civilians, torture and 
extra-judicial killings by the military and police of suspected rebel sympathizers.
When Senator Benigno Aquino III assumed the office of President of the 
Philippines in June 2010, he vowed and kept a promise to back the peace pro-
cess. The Philippine government and the MILF resumed the peace process 
through the brokerage of foreign countries, especially Malaysia. A breakthrough 
came when both sides signed the FAB (Framework Agreement on the Bangsam-
oro) in October 2012. In March 2014, after amending additional points includ-
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ing power-sharing and the distribution of revenues from natural resources in 
the proposed new autonomous territory called Bangsamoro, both sides finally 
agreed to, and signed, the CAB (Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsam-
oro). In doing so, the MILF and the Philippine government established a new 
milestone in the peace process in Mindanao9.
5   “Bangsa” and “Ummah” — National and Transnational Dimen-
sions of the Moro Secessionist Movement
5.1  Ideological background of the MILF
In this section, I will examine the ideological background of the MILF as a social 
movement in detail. It is often pointed out that the MNLF is a more “secular” 
oriented ethno-national movement, while the MILF is more “religious”, putting 
their political ideology in the broad context of Islamism. However, in my view 
this evaluation is just a rough generalization. The real situation is more complex 
and contains internal dynamics and developments.
In the first place, the political ideology of the MILF started from a realiza-
tion that the ancestral homeland of the Bangsa Moro (the Moro nation) had 
been illegitimately grabbed by Christian settlers since American colonial times. 
So, the MILF demands the right of return of this grabbed land and the right of 
self-determination or secession from the Philippines. In a more abstract way, we 
could say the political ideology of the MILF starts from the discourse of “forced 
de-territorialization” by colonization, then claims the right of “re-territorializa-
tion”. In this sense, the MILF has commonality with the MNLF in its “secular” 
(ethno-) national character in seeking secession or substantial autonomy based 
on the right of self-determination of “Bangsa”, or ‘Nation’.
On the other hand, we can also notice to a certain degree, a more “religious” 
or “Islamic” orientation in the ideology and discourse of the MILF. Interestingly, 
some of these “Islamic” elements of the MILF are quite trans-national in nature. 
Thus, the ideology of the MILF as a social movement is based on, a bit paradox-
ically, both national and trans-national (or even “global”, or de-territorialized) 
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dimensions. Concretely speaking, the MILF practices activities based on the 
transnational Islamic network and the idea or concept of Ummah. Ummah gener-
ally refers to a transnational (or global) Islamic community and it has been con-
ceived as borderless and global in a sense that it contains all Muslims regardless 
of race, nationality, country of origin, and so on. I found this distinctive politi-
co-religious ideal of the MILF in my own field research. Since 2007, I have in-
termittently directly interviewed MILF activists, including some of the members 
of the Central Committee, the highest decision making body of the MILF. From 
the results of my research, it is easy to observe a kind of transnational network-
ing supporting the MILF’s social movement.
For example, if you look at the life histories or backgrounds of MILF staff 
and activists, it is not rare to find a person who has travelled in various Muslim 
countries such as Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia, or 
Indonesia. Some activists sojourn in these countries to study in Islamic schools 
and/or make pilgrimage to Islamic holy sites. Some are de-facto exiles from 
the Philippines, avoiding arrest. Small numbers of them join volunteer Muslim 
armies to fight a “Jihad” in Afghanistan or Pakistan10.
Additionally, in the MILF political consciousness and discourse, we can 
observe such “transnational” dimensions of Islam classing the MILF as part and 
parcel of development of the Ummah. The discourses of the late Salamat Hashim, 
a MILF founder, quite obviously positions MILF in the context of transnational 
political Islam. Hashim is a Maguindanaoan Muslim, originally from the Magu-
indanao region. He studied in Al-Azhar, a prestigious Islamic University in Cairo, 
Egypt. He was then influenced by political thought of the Muslim Brotherhood 
and Sayyd Qutub, a dominant figure of political Islam at the time. Besides that, 
he also formed his own political thought by examining various foreign Muslim 
intellectuals including Maududi of South Asia and Khomeini of Iran (Lingga 
1995, Decasa 1999).
In his statements, he frequently legitimatizes the cause and struggle of the 
MILF in the context of solidarity with the global Ummah. For example, he has 
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stated that support for the Bangsa Moro by the Muslim Ummah worldwide is deci-
sive and necessary in the struggle. He also appealed for material and moral sup-
port for the MILF from all Muslims in the Ummah (Hashim 2008: 245–246).
According to Salamat, the Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation) as a Muslim nation 
is itself part and parcel of the Ummah. As a result, he continues, it would be in-
fluenced by developments in the global Ummah, which includes all Muslims on 
earth (Lingga 1995: 57). In addition to this, he also reiterates that the ultimate 
purpose of the MILF is to establish a “truly Islamic” government in the ancestral 
domains of Bangsa Moro (namely; Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, Tawi Tawi, Palawan) 
and by doing this, fulfil the law and order which was given to humans by Allah. 
In the political thought of Salamat, this endeavor is conceived as jointly fulfilled 
for the sake of establishing a unified Islamic governance of the Ummah with Mus-
lims in other regions, regardless of race or country (Lingga 1995: 5).
In terms of actual activities in the field, we can identify the influence of 
transnational political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, especially in the 
realm of social welfare, which I will relate in the next section. In any case, the 
MILF’s political ideology has two aspects/dimensions. On the one hand, it has 
a strong (ethno-) national character seeking the return or re-territorialization 
of lost homeland, based on the concept of “Bangsa” or ‘nation’. On the other 
hand, it also contains distinctively “trans-national” Islamic dimensions, both in 
discourse and actual activity, especially in its emphasis on the Ummah, or global 
Islamic community, which encompasses all Muslims regardless of national bor-
ders. Thus we must grasp the MILF in more complex dynamics between these 
dual aspects or dimensions.
5.2  Activities of the MILF and Islamic Resurgence
Here I will explain various MILF movement activities in the social, cultural, and/
or religious fields from a more grass-roots level. In media coverage, the MILF 
is primarily known and described as an rebel organization engaging in armed 
struggle for a secessionist cause. Though this representation is not entirely false 
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in itself, it is not the whole picture, especially if you look at a more grass-roots 
level. In reality, military activity or armed struggle occupies just a small part of 
the various activities of the MILF movement. Mostly, armed struggle is conduct-
ed by the so-called BIAF (Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces), the military wing 
of the MILF. After the fall of Camp Abubakar, the largest MILF camp/strong-
hold, the BIAF has engaged relatively sporadic or small-scale armed encounters 
with government forces using guerrilla tactics.
Though military activity is an important characteristic which draws media 
attention, it is a relatively small part of the movement’s activities. The majority of 
the movement’s activists engage in various other non-military activities, includ-
ing social and religious efforts. Before I elaborate, I will explain the internal or-
ganizational structure of the MILF.
Basically, the MILF has organized into a quasi-government, semi-bureau-
cratic structure. In some areas in Mindanao, it already provides de-facto gover-
nance, including legal courts based on Sharia (Islamic Law), Madrasah (Islamic 
Schools), a kind of police organization, and even a jail system. This de-facto in-
formal shadow government consists of several “Committees” or “Departments”. 
Each “Committee” has its own particular function and/or role for particular ac-
tivities like the “Committee of Education”, the “Committee of Information”, and 
so on. Among these activities, social activities and dawwah (religious propagation 
activities) are especially interesting at a grass-roots level in relation to ordinary 
Muslims of the Moro community.
Firstly, I address the social activities of the MILF. From my research findings 
in the MILF influenced areas of Mindanao, I found that major social activities 
of the MILF are mainly conducted by the so-called “Social Welfare Committee”, 
one of several committees of the movement. The Social Welfare Committee is 
in charge of various activities concerning the social welfare of Muslims in several 
MILF-dominated areas in Mindanao. For example, these social welfare activities 
include livelihood projects, management/assistance of Madrasah schools and 
orphanages for children of poor Muslims in conflict affected areas in the region. 
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Financially, so-called “zakat” (religious tax/alms giving) by Muslims is a major 
source of funding for these activities.
We highlight that this kind of social activity program shares strong similar-
ities with that of several Islamic organizations/movements in the Middle East, 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine, or Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, (Clark 2004). At this point, we can observe other strong transnational 
influences from other regions (mainly the Middle East) on the MILF in the con-
text of its social movement aspect.
Another interesting thing is that the MILF engages not only in social activity, 
but also in religious activity furthering Islamic resurgence, namely dawwah, or ac-
tivities to propagate “correct” or “true” versions of Islam to ordinary local folks. 
This Islamic religious activity is conducted by the “Dawwah Committee” of the 
MILF and is mostly through cooperation and support from local ustadzs (teachers 
of Madrasah) ulamas (Islamic Sharia jurists/intellectuals), and so on. For exam-
ple, in Magindanao province or in Sultan Kudarat province where I conducted 
field research, praying five times a day, eating “halal” foods, and wearing proper 
“Islamic” attire including “hijab” (head scarves), are emphasized among other 
practices as a result of Islamic resurgence, or the MILF dawwah movement. For 
more detail, please see Table 1, which reproduces the content of a MILF Daw-
wah Committee notice board.
This kind of dawwah activity is an important pillar for the MILF. As a matter 
of fact, it is thought to be an aim of the MILF Dawwah Committee to promote 
proper Islamization through propagating a “correct” or “true” version of Islam. 
In relation to this, I found that in some MILF areas, a kind of Sharia court system 
operates which judges criminal cases not by secular laws but according to prin-
ciples of Sharia. One of my informants, a MILF activist, explained the issue of 
MILF Islamization as follows: 
“The objective and intention of the MILF is to promote gradual Islamization 
(of the rural Moro community) in a consultative manner. On the issue of Sharia, it 
is already implemented in several areas (controlled by the MILF). However, it is not 
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enforced in a rough-and-ready way. For example, we are not imposing the cutting of 
arms as punishment for suspects of theft. On the contrary, we obey proper rules and 
regulations, collecting sufficient evidence and witnesses before giving verdicts. And 
even if one is found guilty of theft, the ordinary punishment for him/her is not the 
cutting of arms, but fines, compensating the victims, and/or imprisonment, depend-
ing on the situation. Normally, local ulamas who studied Islamic jurisprudence in 
Middle Eastern countries such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia would act as judges of the 
Sharia court11.”
Previously, this kind of dawwah activity and Islamization was more dominant in 
some parts of Mindanao, especially among the Muslim areas influenced by the 
MILF. However, in recent days, the socio-political influence of the MILF has 
substantially extended to areas beyond Mindanao island, including some parts 
of Sulu, Tawi Tawi, and Basilan provinces, previous strongholds of the MNLF. 
In the process of expanding MILF influence, it has been often emphasized that 
dawwah, or propagating a “truly Islamic” way of living, is one of the movement’s 
objectives. For example, in a forum organized by the MILF in November 2007 
in Sulu, a Central Committee member mentioned the Islamization of the lo-
Table 1  Contents of a Notice board by the MILF Dawwah Committee
Things you should do Things which are “haram” (prohibited)
1. Friday Prayer
2. Conceal “aurat” (lower half of the body, 
and hair , if you are a woman)
3. Keep proper hygiene rules (such as 
limiting excretion to toilets)
4. Greet one another
5. “Halal” works/business (e.g. to refrain 
from selling alcohol, food containing 
pork, etc.)
6. Help each other as good neighbors
7. Read the Quran and obey the teachings 
of Islam
1. To Skip/miss praying
2. To expose “aurat” to other persons
3. Failing to keep distance between differ-
ent gendered unmarried persons
4. Smoking and drinking alcoholic drinks
5. Gambling or other amusements resem-
bling gambling
6. Theft
7. Listening to music (this article was 
omitted recently)
(Posted in a MILF-dominated area in Sultan Kudarat province, February 2009. Origi-
nal text is written in Maguindanao dialect.)
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cal Moro community as an important agenda item, on par with strengthening 
the organization, building up the military wing, and so on. As a matter of fact, 
members of the Dawwah Committee also joined this forum and emphasized the 
importance of teaching and practicing Islam (including zakat) as a guiding prin-
ciple in the struggle for the Moro people.
We thus note that the political agenda of the MILF is, in a sense, also strong-
ly connected to - or contextualized in more religious aspects of - Islamization in 
Muslim dominated areas in the southern Philippines. However, at the same time, 
it is too simplistic to say that the ultimate goal or agenda of the MILF is a “reli-
gious” one, and declare the Mindanao conflict a “religious conflict”. As I have 
explained, the basic and fundamental purpose of the MILF is to recover ances-
tral homeland, which had been grabbed/colonized by Christian settlers backed 
by the central government since the beginning of American colonization. In 
this sense, their ultimate purpose for struggle is not necessarily “religious” in the 
narrow sense of the term, but (ethno-) national; not unlike those of other vari-
ous anti-colonization and self-determination/national-liberation movements in 
post-colonial third world countries.
At the same time, the socio-political movement that the MILF has adopted 
has been contextualized quite notably and distinctly into a cultural setting and 
religious character epitomized by complex dynamics between “folk” Islamic tra-
ditions on the one hand and a transnational Islamic resurgence movement on 
the other.
6.  Concluding Remarks
In pre-colonial days, Muslim society in Mindanao and Sulu was strongly connect-
ed to that of the neighboring maritime Malay Archipelago. As a matter of fact, 
Islamization of the Philippines itself was a direct consequence of deepening mar-
itime trade with other regions, including the Indian Ocean, since the thirteenth 
century. Islam was once an official political ideology in the Islamized sultanates 
of Mindanao and Sulu. Islam dominated not only religious and cultural, but also 
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political and legal aspects of life among the Moro at the time.
However, since the beginning of the twentieth century, the substantial in-
fluence and significance of Islam in the public sphere diminished considerably 
because of the US colonization and secularization of society in general. In this 
way, a kind of de-politicization of Islam had proceeded in Muslim areas in the 
southern Philippines since American colonization. Worse, Moro socio-economic 
status rapidly deteriorated and they became marginalized as a consequence of a 
massive influx of Christian settlers from Luzon and Visayas, and de-territorializa-
tion or displacement from their ancestral homeland.
However, the de-politicization of Islam has notably reversed as a conse-
quence of both Muslim secessionism and the Islamic resurgence trend, which 
have a distinctive transnational character. As I have elaborated in this chapter, 
Islam has been emphasized as one of the socio-political or ideological pillars of 
the MILF. As a matter of fact, the MILF practices various social activities in line 
with Islam, including establishing Madrasahs, Sharia Courts, and promoting Is-
lamic resurgence or dawwah.
In this way, I conclude that once marginalized Islam has re-emerged as an 
important socio-political factor in Muslim area in the southern Philippines, in 
the context of Islamic resurgence and the political Muslim secessionist move-
ment. Another point I would like to emphasize here is that the MILF movement 
retains dual characters of both “re- territorialization” and “de-territorialization”. 
On the one hand, it seeks to re-establish autonomy and self-determination of its 
lost homeland. On the other hand, the movement itself has developed in the 
context of a quite “transnational” Islamic network based on a concept of a global 
Ummah. This transnationalism is also connected, for example, to cross-border 
migration (including pilgrimages, studying abroad, joining “Jihad”, and so on) of 
the Moros from the southern Philippines to Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc.
In this way, the socio-political movement of the Moro is conducted in a 
much more dynamic way, which includes the complex inter-play of local, nation-
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al, and trans-national dimensions.
Abbreviations
ARMM: Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
ASG: Abu Sayyaf Group
BJE: Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
BIAF: Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
CAB: Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CVO: Civilian Voluntary Organization
FAB: Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
IDP: Internally Displaced People
IMT: International Monitoring Team
MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIM: Mindanao Independence movement
MNLF: Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD: Memorandum Of Agreement on Ancestral Domain 
OIC: Organization of Islamic Conference
Time Table of Peace Process (1996.9. -2014.3)
1996. 9: Final Peace Agreement between MNLF and Philippine Government bro-
kered by OIC. MNLF agrees to join ARMM, instead of total independence 
for Mindanao. MILF does not join the Agreement.
2000. 3: President Estrada declares “All Out War” policy against MILF. AFP attacks 
and conquers Camp Abubakar, the MILF stronghold in Mindanao. Salamat 
Hasim, leader of MILF, declares “Jihad” against the Philippine government.
2000. 4: ASG kidnaps more than 20 hostages from Sipadan Island diving resort in 
eastern Malaysian state of Sabah.
2001. 6: MILF and Philippine government reach tentative cease-fire brokered by the 
Libyan government.
2001.11: Misuari faction of MNLF attacks AFP base in Jolo.
2003. 2: AFP attacks MILF base in Mindanao as part of “anti-terrorist” operation.
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2004.10: Malaysian government dispatches IMT to Mindanao as a peace monitoring 
activity. 
2004.12: Peace negotiations on “Ancestral Domain” between MILF and the Philippine 
government starts, brokered by Malaysian government.
2007. 7: Fighting occurs between ASG and AFP in Sulu.
2008. 8: MILF and the Philippine government agree to sign MOA-AD (Memorandum 
of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain) which would make possible the es-
tablishment of BJE in Mindanao and finally end the conflict. However, just 
before the official signing ceremony, Supreme Court of the Philippines rules 
it unconstitutional. After the cancellation, heavy fighting erupts between 
BIAF and AFP (including CVO). Hundreds of thousands of IDP flee to vari-
ous ECs in Mindanao.
2010. 6: Benigno Aquino III, newly elected president of the Philippines, restarts 
peace process with MILF.
2012.10: MILF and the Philippine government sign FAB.
2014. 3: MILF and the Philippine government sign CAB.
Notes
 1 For a general socio-historical overview of Muslims in the Philippines, see (Majul 
1973, Gowing 1979).
 2 See (Majul 1973, Majul 1985b).
 3 See (Majul 1973, Saleeby 1963).
 4 See (Warren 1981).
 5 See (Abubakar 2009, Majul 1973).
 6 For detail on the relationship between so-called “folk-Islam” traditions and the Is-
lamic resurgence, please see (Tokoro 2006).
 7 For details of American colonial administration of Moro society, especially its edu-
cational policy, please see the chapter by Suzuki in this volume.
 8 For general background, outline, development, and impacts of the Mindanao con-
flict, please see (George 1980, Majul 1985a, Che Man 1990, Tan 1993, Jubair 1999, 
Diaz 2003, Mastura 2012).
 9 However, the BIFF, another breakaway Muslim armed group led by Ustadz Kato (a 
former MILF commander) opposed the peace deal and continue armed struggle. 
Also, a faction of the MNLF led by Nur Misuari has strongly opposed the peace 
process and caused a relatively large armed confrontation with government forc-
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es in Zamboanga City in September 2013. The Abu Sayyaf Group also remains a 
security threat and engages in various de-facto criminal activities like kidnapping, 
and sporadic fighting with the government forces.
 10 Detail and descriptions of the organization and activities of the MILF in this chap-
ter is based on my fieldwork which I intermittently conducted on Mindanao Is-
land, particularly in Cotabato City, Davao City, Maguindanao, and Sultan Kudarat, 
between 2007 and 2012. I appreciate the substantial help and moral support from 
Datu Michael O. Mastura during my field research in the area. However, I am re-
sponsible for any mistakes or shortcomings in this chapter.
 11 The interview was held at one of the MILF strongholds in Sultan Kudarat province 
in February 2009.
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